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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 24 The act also
provided that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should control the prac25
These rules require the
tice and procedure of the suit under the Act.
26
and permit necessary 27 and
suit be brought by the real party in interest,
permissive 28 joinder of parties. Under modern statutes, valid tort claims
are transferable by assignment if they pass the test of survival 29 and the
30
The fact
assignee may sue in his own name as the real party in interest.
that the assignor was joined as party defendant raises the constitutional right
31
But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to a jury trial by the assignee.
are sufficiently elastic to try government issues to the court and private is2Yet the possibility that the Federal Tort Claims Act
sues to the jury.
may be an exception to the Anti-Assignment Act by implication was not
considered by the Supreme Court in the instant case.
Although the reasons for enforcing the Anti-Assignment Act are absent
from the instant case, the majority felt that recognizing the assignment as
valid when all parties are before the court would in effect, repeal the statute
by mere judicial construction in plain disregard of the unequivocal language
of the act.
JOHN G. MUTCHLER.
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OF AGENCY VOID. - The plaintiff orally employed defendant, a real estate
agent, to purchase certain land for him, but advanced no money. Defendant purchased the property but took title to the land in his own name.
Plaintiff sued to impose a constructive trust on the property, contending that
defendant had taken title to the property in fraudulent breach of their purchase agreement. Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on the basis
of a specific statute covering oral contracts with real estate brokers to purchase property and making such contracts void unless in writing.' Upon
appeal, it was held, that the agreement created a relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties to which the statute did not apply and that
24. 28 U.S.C. §1346 (b).
25. 60 Stat. 844 (1946).
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (a).
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (a).
28. Fed. B. Civ. P. 20 (a).
29. Clark, Code Pleading p. 164 (2d ed. 1947).
30. Clark, op. cit. supra at 165.
31. See 59 Yale L.J. 1515 (1950).
32. See note 30 supra.
1. N.M. Ann. Stat. §75-143 (Supp. 1951): "§1. Any agreement entered into subsequent to the first day of July, 1949, authorizing or employing an agent or broker to pur-chase or sell lands, tenements, or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them,
for a commission or other compensation, shall be void unless the agreement, or some
memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. No such agreement
or employment shall be considered exclusive unless specifically so stated therein." Also
see N.D. Rev. Code §9-0604 (i943): "The following contracts are invalid, unless the
same or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party
to be charged, or by his agent . . . 4. An agreement . . . for the sale of real property.
or of an interest therein . . ."

RECENT CASES

a constructive trust should be imposed on the property. Harris v. Dunn, 234
P.2d 821 (N.M. 1951).
Where an agent purchases land in his own name in violation of an oral
contract, the majority of cases construing a general Statute of Frauds have
imposed a constructive or resulting trust as did the court in the Harriscase. - A distinction is sometimes drawn between instances where the agent
uses his own money and those where he uses money of his principal 3 but
this would seem to be the minority view 4 and the trend is away from such
a distinction.' The view of the cases supporting the instant case is that
the breach of confidential or fiduciary relationship is sufficient reason for
the imposition of a constructive trust. A fiduciary relationship has been
held to exist where the parties are members of the same family; 6 where a
prior course of dealings has resulted in the placing of confidence in one
person by another; 7 where the agent has used the principal's money to
make part payment on the property; s or where a person has relied on the
promise to convey by the other and has thereby failed to take action which
he would otherwise have taken to his resulting detriment. 9
While the language of the statute involved in the Harris case might seem
to preclude a holding in favor of the principal, the court is not alone in
determining that a constructive trust will arise from the fiduciary relationship of the parties even though the contract itself is rendered void by statute. 10
The essential ingredient for the imposition of a constructive trust appears
to be unjust enrichment and if this is present, generally the lack of an
express contract is no bar to the action."
Since the result is not based upon a finding that a contract existed in the
Harris case, it is submitted that the result reached there is sound. While it
is true that the purchaser, in similar situations, may protect himself by reducing the agreement to writing, it should be considered that the real estate
agent, whose whole business is concerned with such or similar transactions,
has a practical advantage over the less-worldly purchaser. A slight tip of
the scales of justice to the favor of the inexperienced purchaser would seem
to be an injustice to no one.
FRANCIS J.
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